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Tax and Social Context: Legal Fictions Within
Tax
Tessa Davis*
There is a widely-held and oft-disputed concept of tax exceptionalism—that
tax is an area of law apart. The idea may be expressed in the view that tax
administrative law is not bound by the same restraints as administrative law
more broadly1 or simply in a vague sense that the study and practice of tax are
categorically different than other “traditional” areas of law such as criminal law
or contract law. If accepted, this view might suggest that tax law and policy is a
poor fit for a symposium on American Legal Fictions. Legal fictions are most
often theorized in areas of judicially driven law. Statutory law, by contrast,
dominates tax. Perhaps, then, tax law is an area in which legal fictions are less
frequent and less relevant.
This Essay advances a different view. Specifically, I consider whether tax
scholarship could benefit from a deliberate effort to identify legal fictions, as well
as develop a theory of the role legal fictions serve within tax law. The success of
this project, I contend, depends on embracing a broader view of legal fictions
than is accepted by some. After a brief discussion of traditional legal fictions in
tax, I consider two rules—one judicial and one statutory—that may be
understood as legal fictions under a broader definition of legal fiction, as well as
lay out the insights for tax law and policy that may follow from adopting a
broader definition.
*
Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. This Essay
developed from a presentation given at Savannah Law School’s symposium on American
Legal Fictions. The author would like to thank Caprice Roberts and Savannah Law Review
for the invitation to be a part of the symposium, as well as her fellow speakers and
attendees.
1
See e.g., Richard Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative Law and Tax Exceptionalism, 64
Duke L.J. Online 21, 21 (2014). “‘Tax exceptionalism’ holds that, like the animals of
an island long cut off from a continent, the administrative law of tax has evolved into
different forms than those found in general administrative law.”
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Despite his focus on common law rather than the statutory and regulatory
law that comprises so much of tax law, Lon Fuller’s classic discussion of legal
fictions bears repeating. A legal fiction is, Fuller states in his essential work,
Legal Fictions, “either (1) a statement propounded with a complete or partial
consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having
utility.”2 This definition has been expanded and critiqued in the intervening
years but remains an influential articulation of the concept. Even with its
common law origins, Fuller’s concept of legal fictions arises in tax law and
doctrine. A few examples will help clarify the types of traditional legal fictions
that arise in tax.
To the extent scholars have focused on legal fictions and tax, a frequent
point of focus has been the impact of the legal fiction of the “corporation as
entity.”3 Long before Citizens United, the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”)
accepted the view that a corporation is more than simply the aggregation of its
shareholders and is, instead, a separate entity. A corporation files its own tax
return, calculates its taxable income, and determines its tax liability under its
own rate schedule.4 A corporation may engage in taxable transactions with its
shareholders.5 Accepting the idea that a corporation is an entity separate from its
shareholders gives rise to an aspect of tax policy that is both heralded and muchmaligned: the double taxation of corporations. If a corporation were instead
treated as is a partnership—as a mere aggregate of its owners—double taxation
of the corporation, and the complex tax-planning strategies that arise to mitigate
its effects, might be reduced.6 Despite the complexity it creates, the fiction of the
corporation as entity may serve other policy ends that justify its existence, such
as acting as a regulatory check on corporate behavior.7
Other examples arise outside of corporate taxation. Professor Nancy Knauer
identifies 26 U.S.C. § 7872 as an example of a traditional but statutory legal
LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967).
See H. David Rosenbloom, Banes of an Income Tax: Legal Fictions, Elections,
Hypothetical Determinations, Related Party Debt, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 17 (2004) (arguing
that the corporation-as-entity fiction is one of three factors that has created the morass of
code provisions and regulations that govern related-party debt, and the attendant tax
avoidance techniques); Nancy Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 70, 79 (2010).
4
26 U.S.C. § 11 (setting out the rates schedule that applies to corporations).
5
For example, when a corporation pays dividends to its shareholders, the
shareholders have taxable income. 26 U.S.C. § 301 (setting out the tax consequences of
distributions of property by a corporation to its shareholders “with respect to” the stock
of the corporation held by those shareholders). Section 316 defines when a distribution
constitutes a dividend. 26 U.S.C. § 316.
6
Theories regarding the optimal taxation of corporations abound and corporate
integration is a hot topic in both political and academic circles. For a sampling of
scholarship on the topic, see, e.g., Ed D. Kleinbard, The Trojan Horse of Corporate
Integration, 152 TAX NOTES 957 (2016); Michael Graetz & Alvin Warren, Integration of
Corporate and Shareholder Taxes, NAT’L TAX J. (forthcoming).
7
Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah, a supporter of corporate tax reform, advances this
view. See, e.g., Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1193 (2004).
2
3
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fiction.8 That section deems a transfer of interest payments from a debtor to a
creditor within the context of qualifying below market loans. Just as the property
owner is deemed to invite a trespassing child onto his property when an
attractive nuisance is present, section 7872 deems transfers of money to occur
which the parties, the Service, and, if the dispute continues, the court know did
not, in fact, occur.
Yet while some examples of traditional legal fictions arise in tax, the
literature on legal fictions in tax is relatively scant. Were Fuller able to offer an
explanation as to why, it might simply be that tax law is composed more of “legal
facts” and “legal relations”—legal rules that bear no relationship to non-legal
facts or extra-legal facts—than laws that construct scenarios that can be proven
to be objectively false.9 Much of tax law may be akin to the legal concept of title.
Title, in Fuller’s view, should not be understood as a legal fiction, as title is
merely “a means of grouping together certain rather complex legal results in a
convenient formula.”10 Any statements made regarding title, then, should not be
taken as fictions but rather as “an attempt to describe . . . a complex legal
situation.”11 Professor Knauer takes this view in her argument that legal fictions,
while present in tax law, should not be understood so broadly as to encompass,
for example, the concept of income itself.12 The Code, Professor Knauer writes,
is simply “a regime spun out of whole cloth as a fair and equitable method to
apportion the burdens of citizenship.”13 The Code’s concept of income cannot
then be a fiction because income is, quite simply, whatever we as a society say it
is.
Many scholars do not accept such limitations on the concept of legal
fictions, however. Writing outside of tax, Professor Peter Smith argues that rules
that expressly prohibit expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness
testimony should, for example, be viewed as examples of “new legal fictions.”14
8
Knauer, supra note 3, at 87 (“In my Taxation class, I patiently explain the virtues of
legal fictions to still skeptical students. By far my favorite example is Section 7872 of the
Internal Revenue Code, which stands out for its complex and multi-layered deeming
principles. It establishes a statutory definition of ‘foregone interest’ as the amount of
interest that would have been charged on a loan had the loan borne interest in accordance
with the prevailing applicable federal rate. Of course, this is a mere fiction and no interest
is actually charged. Under section 7872, this statutorily created ‘foregone interest’ is
deemed transferred from the lender to the borrower and then retransferred from the
borrower to the lender as interest. Again, given that this is a fiction, no money actually
changes hands. Magically, however, this fictive interest can produce a hefty tax bill.
Depending upon the context of the underlying transaction, this ‘foregone interest’ can be
subject to income tax twice—once in the hands of the lender and then again in the hands
of the borrower. And, so is the power of the fiction.”)
9
Fuller, supra note 2, at 30–33; John A. Miller, Liars Should Have Good Memories:
Legal Fictions and the Tax Code, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 22–25 (1993).
10
Fuller, supra note 2, at 28.
11
Id. at 29.
12
Knauer, supra note 3, at 75 n.33.
13
Id. at 109.
14
Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1441–42 (2007) (“A court
deploys a new legal fiction when (1) the court offers an ostensibly factual supposition as a
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Such a rule is a legal fiction, Smith writes, “because (1) it is offered as a factual,
rather than a normative, supposition, and (2) social science research
demonstrates persuasively that it is false.” 15 Writing specifically on tax,
Professor John Miller argues for a similar though distinct expansion of the
concept of legal fiction. Miller pushes back against Fuller’s premise that legal
relations should not be viewed as legal fictions, writing “[i]n my view, Fuller
overstates the case for rejecting legal relations as a form of legal fiction because
legal relations can have a social context as well as a legal context.”16 Legal
fictions are not, then, limited to such obvious falsities as the idea that a property
owner invites a child to trespass, but may encompass legal rules that depend
upon an underlying assertion that is empirically or socially false.17
Embracing a broader concept of legal fictions may prove a useful tool in
analyzing and critiquing the Code. A fiction, presumably, serves some policy end
and considering whether a rule is a fiction pushes us to deliberately consider that
end.18 Returning to the imputed interest of 26 U.S.C. § 7872, Miller writes:
When a statute contradicts reality, we want to know why the statute
contradicts reality. In a case such as section 7872, we may have
difficulty in comprehending the underlying economic theory, but at
least our recognition of the statute’s falsity has set us upon the path
toward understanding. Taking note of the fiction is the first step toward
understanding its purpose or attacking its utility.19
To be sure, many scholars have and continue to take on the work of
ensuring that the Code is deliberate and consistent in advancing its policy
goals. 20 But the goals of the Code—raising revenue, advancing social and
ground for creating a legal rule or modifying, or refusing to modify, an existing legal rule;
and (2) the factual supposition is descriptively inaccurate. In most cases, the premise is
false because empirical research has demonstrated that it is false, although occasionally
the factual supposition so conflicts with general knowledge and conventional wisdom that
it can be characterized as a new legal fiction even without reference to empirical research.
To be a new legal fiction, the court must offer the factual supposition as a (or the) basis
supporting the court’s normative choice among competing possible legal rules.”).
15
Id. at 1441.
16
Miller, supra note 9, at 21–22.
17
Miller is careful not to expand the concept of a legal fiction beyond utility. For
example, Miller argues that we must avoid categorizing as fictions rules that may only
sometimes be false. To be a legal fiction, a rule must (1) “involve[ ] the implied or express
assertion of a fact that one standing outside the legal system would regard as clearly false,
such as the assertion that a daughter owns her mother’s stock or the claim that a person
flying off on vacation has this week’s pay in hand when in fact the paycheck is still lying
on his desk at work”; and (2) must not simply “state a generalization that in some cases
may be false. Instead legal fictions deliberately overstate a comparative statement and are
always false.” Id. at 8.
18
Fuller, supra note 2, at 71; Miller, supra note 9, at 28; Smith, supra note 14, at
1477–78.
19
Miller, supra note 9, at 18.
20
Critical tax scholars have, for example, explored the definitions of family and
concepts of marriage found in the Code, assessing their utility, their basis in lived
experience and implications for economic and social policy. See, e.g., Tessa R. Davis,
34
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economic policy—and its metrics of success—fairness, administrability and
efficiency—are many and often conflicting. Embracing a broader concept of legal
fictions—one in which a rule is a fiction when it relies upon an empirically or
socially invalid analogy—may expose as fictions heretofore undertheorized rules.
And because identifying a fiction begs analysis of its utility, a deliberate effort to
identify fictions in tax creates the opportunity for rooting out tax laws that may
no longer serve their intended purpose, or that serve purposes no longer
intended.
Let us turn now to an example to explore the potential value of applying a
broader concept of legal fictions to the study of tax law and policy. Consider a
common concept frequently introduced in an introductory Income Tax course:
the tax treatment of nonrecourse debt. Before identifying the legal fiction in the
treatment of such debt, however, it is necessary to have a working knowledge of
the foundational tax treatment of debt.
While the Code and Treasury Regulations provide a partial definition of
income,21 tax law relies upon the courts to fully flesh-out this all-important
concept. The 1955 Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co. provides the oft-cited judicial definition of income, identifying as income
“undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayer[]
has complete dominion.” 22 With this definition in mind, let us begin by
considering how debt fits into the concept of income.
Mapping the Families of the Internal Revenue Code, 22 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 179
(2015); Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual
Filing in the United States, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 605, 609, 648 (2010); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Love, Money and the IRS: Family, Income Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax
Return, 45 Hastings L.J. 63, 104, 109 (1993); James E. Maule, Tax and Marriage:
Unhitching the Horse and the Carriage, 67 Tax Notes 539 (1995). For a discussion of
how the tax code differentially treated unmarried and same sex couples pre-Windsor, see,
for example, Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 805
(2008); Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code, 34 U.S.F.
L. Rev. 465 (2000); Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in the
Joint Return World, 61 Hastings L.J. 651 (2010); Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity
and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. Va. L. Rev. 129 (1998); Theodore P. Seto, The
Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1529 (2008);
Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54
Tax L. Rev. 1 (2000).
21
26 U.S.C. § 61, mirroring the Sixteenth Amendment, defines gross income as
“income from whatever source derived.” It then lists a representative but expressly not
exhaustive list of items of income, including the obvious, such as wages or gains from
property sales, and the perhaps less obvious, such as “income from cancellation of
indebtedness.” 26 U.S.C.A. § 61(a). The Sixteenth Amendment states that “Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.”
22
Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). The opinion addressed
two separate cases, Glenshaw Glass Co. v. C. I. R., 18 T.C. 860 (1952) and William
Goldman Theatres v. Comm’r, 19 T.C. 637 (1953), both of which originated in the Tax
Court. Taxpayers in both cases argued that potential items of income—fraud and treble
damages, and solely treble damages, respectively—were not income, relying heavily upon
the 1920 Supreme Court decision in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). In
35
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Imagine a taxpayer, Atticus, takes out a $20,000 private loan to help finance
his engineering degree. When the loan proceeds are disbursed, Atticus will see
his bank account swell by $20,000. Should Atticus add this $20,000 to his gross
income total at tax time? The tax answer to that question is, and has been, no.
The rationale is fairly straightforward: though Atticus has received a gain of a
sort, that gain came at a price, namely the obligation to repay the amount
borrowed.23 Put in the language of Glenshaw Glass, the taxpayer who borrows has
no accession to wealth because any ostensible gain comes with an equal and
offsetting obligation to repay.24 When that equal and offsetting obligation to pay
has teeth—when the creditor can garnish wages or possess assets if the debtor
defaults—the rationale for excluding loan proceeds from income seems sound.
But the strength of the rationale weakens when the creditors right to full
repayment is curtailed as in the case of nonrecourse debt.
The proper tax treatment of debt depends, in theory, on who bears the
economic burden of that debt.25 Stated differently, who, when everything goes
belly-up, is most exposed to risk of economic loss? Consider the example of a
nonrecourse car loan. If an individual purchases a $15,000 car with $5,000 cash
and $10,000 loan, the creditor is exposed to potential loss from the decline in
value of the car. Assume that the purchaser makes two payments of $175 ($150
interest and $25 principal) on the car before defaulting. Also assume that the
purchaser got in a small accident in the vehicle before defaulting, resulting in the
Macomber, the Court upheld the view that income is “the gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined.” Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207 (citing Doyle Case, 247 U.S.
183, 185 (1918)). Accordingly, the taxpayers in Glenshaw Glass and Goldman Theatres
argued that, because their respective damages were neither the fruits of their labor, nor
returns to capital, the damages were not taxable as income. The Court in Glenshaw Glass
did not overrule Macomber but instead recast it as a correct but limited decision. Glenshaw
Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431 (“In that context—distinguishing gain from capital—the
definition served a useful purpose. But it was not meant to provide a touchstone to all
future gross income questions.”).
23
See United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1967) (“A loan does not
in itself constitute income to the borrower, because whatever temporary economic benefit
he derives from the use of the funds is offset by the corresponding obligation to repay
them.”).
24
For an introductory discussion to the tax treatment of loans, see, e.g., J. Martin
Burke & Michael K. Friel, Taxation of Individual Income Ch. 3 (11th
ed. 2015).
25
See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.752-2, 1.752-3. The bane of students studying partnership
tax and a source of significant complexity in tax practice, these and other regulations help
determine each partner’s share of a partnership’s debt, setting up the corollary impacts of
that determination. Treasury Regulation §1.752-2(a) states the general rule that “[a]
partner’s share of a recourse partnership liability equals the portion of that liability, if any,
for which the partner or related person bears the economic risk of loss.” Bearing the risk
of loss is defined as being “obligated to make a payment” in the event the debts of the
partnership came due. § 1.752-2(b). As true economic risk of loss is limited when the debt
is nonrecourse, determining the share of such liabilities is, necessarily, more complex.
Overwriting the specifics, the regulations use share of profits rather than risk of loss as the
relevant metric. § 1.752-3. See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.704-2 (governing allocations attributable
to nonrecourse liabilities.).
36
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car declining in value by $7000 to $8,000. Because the loan is nonrecourse, the
creditor’s only means of recouping the debt is by repossessing the car. At the
time of repossession the debt outstanding is $9,950 ($10,000 less two $25
principal payments) while the value of the car is only $8,000. Without the right
to possess other assets, the creditor will simply not recover the remaining $1,950
owed. If the debt were instead recourse, the creditor would not be exposed to the
same risk from decline in value of the asset, because she could simply find value
elsewhere by garnishing wages, possessing other assets, et cetera.
One area in which this important distinction between recourse and
nonrecourse debt looms large is in the concept of basis. The Code defines basis
and a multitude of provisions exist to manage basis in different areas of tax.26
Stepping back from doctrine, however, the concept is relatively easily grasped.
Consider the following hypothetical: Abby purchases a home with $200,000
cash. A few years after purchasing the home, she sells it for $250,000. Abby’s
proper taxable gain from the sale is only $50,000.27 To say that Abby has a
$250,000 gain upon the sale would ignore the fact that Abby had already
invested $200,000 cash into acquiring the home. Upon the sale she simply
turned $200,000 worth of the value of the home back into cash, leaving $50,000
as the new, taxable accession to wealth.28 Basis is simply the means by which we
track a taxpayer’s ongoing investment in an asset. Per the language of the Code,
Abby held the home with a $200,000 § 1012 cost basis.
Where basis starts to get more interesting is where debt becomes part of the
means of acquisition. Returning to our car purchaser, three potential basis values
emerge: (1) the $5,000 cash paid; (2) the full $15,000, representing her $5,000
cash plus the $10,000 debt assumed; or (3) $5,000 basis increasing with the
amount of principal in each payment. Were her debt recourse, option 2 would be
correct. Though she only invested $5,000 of her own cash she will, either
through payment of the loan or surrendering the car and any the assets required
to satisfy the debt, be on the hook for its full value. Stated differently, the
assumption of the debt is a real cost. The same logic need not hold, however,
when the debt is nonrecourse, because, as discussed above, the purchaser may
not ever actually have to pay the debt. In that case, option 3 might be the most
accurate means of tracking basis.29 Herein is where the tax treatment of debt and
the concept of legal fictions merge.
26
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1015 (governing basis of gift property in the hands of the
donee).
27
26 U.S.C. § 1001 dictates this result. It defines gain as the excess of amount
realized over the taxpayer’s adjusted basis. Amount realized is the amount of cash or fair
market value of property received (herein, $250,000) less Abby’s $200,000 basis. Section
1016 sets out a number of adjustments to basis while § 1012 defines the starting point of
cost basis.
28
Though beyond the scope of this paper, Abby’s gain on the home may not be
taxable if she qualifies for an exclusion from income of the gain from the sale of a primary
residence. See § 121. Further, Abby’s gain may be characterized as capital gain per § 1221,
rather than ordinary gain, meaning it would be subject to the more favorable, lower rates
of § 1(h) (currently 0%, 15%, or 20%).
29
Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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In Crane v. Comm’r30 and Comm’r v. Tufts, the Supreme Court established
the principal that nonrecourse debt should be respected as true debt. In Crane,
the Court reasoned that nonrecourse debt assumed increases the basis of the
debtor.31 And when that same debtor was relieved of debt, she realized a true
benefit akin to having received cash in the amount of the outstanding debt.32 The
Court opined, however, in now famous footnote 37, that nonrecourse debt might
not always be respected as true debt, writing:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the
mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a
benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might
be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or
transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot.33
The facts of footnote 37 were then tested in Tufts. In that case, the Court
modified the logic of Crane but upheld its key tenet: nonrecourse debt is true
debt.34 Herein emerges a potential legal fiction.
Crane and Tufts present an interesting test of the concept of legal fictions
within tax. Under a narrow view of legal fictions, the assertion that nonrecourse
debt is true debt may not constitute a legal fiction. The concept of debt may not
have a sufficiently extra- or non-legal meaning as to assert that treating
nonrecourse debt as true debt is plainly false. Yet the Court seems to
acknowledge a fictive element to its holding. In his opinion, Justice Blackmun
writes that it is “economic interest,” rather than a true personal obligation for
the full value of the debt, that justifies treating nonrecourse debt as true debt:
Because the value of the property in that case exceeded the amount of
the mortgage, it was in Crane’s economic interest to treat the mortgage
as a personal obligation; only by so doing could she realize upon sale the
appreciation in her equity represented by the $2,500 boot. The
purchaser’s assumption of the liability thus resulted in a taxable
economic benefit to her, just as if she had been given, in addition to the
boot, a sum of cash sufficient to satisfy the mortgage.35
But arguing that it makes sense to pay down a debt because one is building equity
in a property is, as Blackmun acknowledges, substantively different than being
truly liable for the full value of said debt.
To be clear, neither the Court nor the parties contested the validity of the
debt instruments at hand. When the Court upheld the view that nonrecourse
Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 7–14.
32
Id. at 14.
33
Id. at 14 n.37.
34
Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307 (“We are disinclined to overrule Crane, and we conclude
that the same rule applies when the unpaid amount of the nonrecourse mortgage exceeds
the value of the property transferred. Crane ultimately does not rest on its limited theory
of economic benefit; instead, we read Crane to have approved the Commissioner’s
decision to treat a nonrecourse mortgage in this context as a true loan.”).
35
Id. at 306.
30
31

38
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debt should be respected as true debt it was not simply stating the obvious (and
non-fictitious) assertion that a party bound by a legal debt is obligated to pay that
debt whether it is recourse or nonrecourse. Rather, the Court was analyzing
whether nonrecourse debt assumed should be respected as a true cost, and relief
of that debt recognized as an economic benefit. Doing so required considering
who bore the burden of economic loss. Despite the fact that it may be the
creditor who bears that burden when the debt is nonrecourse, the Court felt
compelled to treat nonrecourse debt as true debt, even as it seemed to
understand the falsity of that assertion.
Even if a more narrow view of legal fictions might reject the doctrine of
Crane and Tufts as rising to the level of legal fiction, I believe to do so may be
error. A broader view of legal fictions could embrace the doctrine as fiction and
push us to explore the second defining aspect of a legal fiction: the utility it
supposedly serves. The answer to that question in the context of nonrecourse
debt is, at least in part, administrability.36
By embracing the fiction that nonrecourse debt is equivalent to recourse
debt, the Court advanced the goal of ease of administering a multitude of Code
provisions. Returning to our example of the car purchaser will help clarify this
point. If the Court did not accept the fiction, our purchaser would determine her
basis under the third approach: $5,000 basis increasing with the amount of
principal in each payment. Notably, it was the Service and not the taxpayer that
Under these provisions, if the mortgagor’s equity were the [§] 113(a)
basis, it would also be the original basis from which depreciation
allowances are deducted. If it is, and if the amount of the annual
allowances were to be computed on that value, as would then seem to
be required, they will represent only a fraction of the cost of the
corresponding physical exhaustion, and any recoupment by the
mortgagor of the remainder of that cost can be effected only by the
reduction of his taxable gain in the year of sale. If, however, the amount
of the annual allowances were to be computed on the value of the
property, and then deducted from an equity basis, we would in some
instances have to accept deductions from a minus basis or deny
deductions altogether. The Commissioner also argues that taking the
mortgagor’s equity as the [§] 113(a) basis would require the basis to be
changed with each payment on the mortgage, and that the attendant
problem of repeatedly recomputing basis and annual allowances would
be a tremendous accounting burden on both the Commissioner and the
taxpayer. Moreover, the mortgagor would acquire control over the
timing of his depreciation allowances.
Thus it appears that the applicable provisions of the Act expressly
preclude an equity basis, and the use of it is contrary to certain implicit
principles of income tax depreciation, and entails very great
administrative difficulties. It may be added that the Treasury has never
furnished a guide through the maze of problems that arise in connection
with depreciating an equity basis, but, on the contrary, has consistently
permitted the amount of depreciation allowances to be computed on the
full value of the property, and subtracted from it as a basis. Surely,
Congress’ long-continued acceptance of this situation gives it full
legislative endorsement.
Crane, 331 U.S. at 9–11.
36
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advanced the argument that such computation would be too burdensome. The
Court simply agreed. Understanding the treatment of nonrecourse debt as a legal
fiction (1) pushes us to articulate the rationale for the fiction and (2) sets us on a
path to assess whether the utility justifies the fiction, or if perhaps another
approach would better serve the goals of the relevant law and policy. Respecting
nonrecourse debt as true debt may be right as a matter of policy, but it is no less a
fiction because it is a useful one, and acknowledging its status as a fiction pushes
us to test the justifications for a doctrine that frequently leads to a great deal of
complexity.37
If legal relations and legal fictions exist on a spectrum, perhaps the doctrine
of nonrecourse debt is close enough to a legal fiction so as not to raise many
objections if it is pulled into the legal fiction category. Considering a more
controversial example, however, may further clarify my argument that
embracing a broader notion of legal fictions can reveal heretofore unseen or
under theorized problems in tax law. Though some may conceive of the
definition of a resident alien as simply a legal relation, under a broader concept of
legal fictions 26 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) can be understood as a legal fiction.38
The tax concept of resident alien works to define who is subject to U.S.
taxation. In so doing, it pulls resident noncitizens into the same system of
taxation as governs U.S. citizens.39 The analogy underlying this categorization is
that resident noncitizens are more like U.S. citizens 40 than they are like
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noncitizens. Accordingly, they should be taxed in a similar fashion. Fuller and
adherents to a narrow view of legal fictions might argue that the concept of
citizenship or residence is akin to title—a concept that exists only in law with no
non- or extra-legal truth. The narrow view may, however, miss the mark.
Citizenship, as I discuss in The Tax-Immigration Nexus, is both a legal and a social
phenomenon. If we accept that a rule may be a legal fiction when it conflicts with
the underlying social understanding of a given concept, the tax definition of
resident alien may emerge as a statutory fiction. The value of analyzing §
7701(b)(1)(A) as a legal fiction comes from being forced to consider the socially
or culturally-contingent nature of concepts that claim a degree of objectivity or
descriptive rather than normative goals. The definition of resident alien may be a
fiction meant both to delineate taxable persons and part of a regime meant to
discipline would-be citizens. The second insight comes from taking a critical eye
to how the rule relates to lived reality; stated differently, whether the rule is a
legal fiction. Working with a narrower view of legal fictions may lead to
bypassing this analysis and, perhaps, a less critical acceptance of a potentially
imperfect or problematic rule.
Tax law seems a ripe area in which to explore the extent and purpose of legal
fictions. While such work may help refine the concept of legal fictions itself, of
greater interest to me is the value of a broader, though still limited definition of
legal fictions to critical tax scholarship. By embracing a concept of legal fictions
that encompasses rules that conflict with empirical data or social facts, tax
scholars gain a useful tool for rooting out the potentially undertheorized
justifications for existing rules and doctrine.
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